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Abstract: This essay uses rhetorical analysis to defend the 
population geneticist Richard Lewontin from accusations made by 
E. O. Wilson and others that his Marxist social philosophy distorts 
his empirical science.  I suggest that Lewontin’s appeal to his own 
authority as an experimental evolutionary biologist supports his 
claim that racism has no biological justification and that it is his 
opponents whose assumptions about society distort their scientific 
arguments.  
Keywords: behavior genetics, Darwinism, Ethos, Dobzhansky, T., 
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Authority in Scientific Argumentation 
Richard Lewontin, whose education in biology at Harvard was 
heavily weighted toward statistical mathematics, earned his 
doctorate in zoology at Columbia under the Russian-born geneticist 
Theodosius Dobzhansky in 1954.  Arguably, he was, and in some 
sense still is, the most insightful inheritor of his mentor’s effort to 
use the study of how genes are distributed in populations to turn 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection in an anti-racist, anti-eugenic 
direction (Dobzhansky, 1962; Jackson and Depew, 2017).  “My own 
problematic is the problematic of my professor,” he later wrote. “I 
recognize that everything I do in science I get in one way or another 
from the program he initiated” (Lewontin et al., 2000, 29; 
Lewontin, 1989, 44).  Lewontin was not alone in defending what 
has been called “the biology of democracy” (Beatty, 1994).  Still, he 
was more inclined to deflate his opponents by attacking their 
credentials and character along with their reasoning than, for 
example, his Harvard colleague, ally, and sometime collaborator 
Stephen Jay Gould, the genial tone of whose popular science 
writing was also aimed to laughing his professional enemies out of 
their follies (Gould and Lewontin, 1979).  Lewontin is the most 
obstreperous of Dobzhansky’s heirs. 
As a graduate student, Lewontin found himself in a rhetorical 
situation that Dobzhansky himself was ill-equipped to confront: the 
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molecular revolution in genetics led by James Watson and Francis 
Crick, who in 1953 jointly unraveled the information-carrying 
mechanism of DNA.  This revolution, in whose long wake we are 
still sailing, was at its best indifferent and at its worst hostile to the 
egalitarianism that Dobzhansky, by working closely with heirs to 
the anthropologically based anti-racism of Franz Boas, had 
impressed on the genetic theory of natural selection (Smocovitis, 
2012; Jackson and Depew, 2017).  From the start, Lewontin’s 
strategy was to turn the molecular revolution, whose roots lie in 
biochemistry, against the prejudices brought with them by many of 
its adepts when they began poaching on the territory and authority 
of evolutionary naturalists.  He did so by using the new technique of 
gel electrophoresis to experimentally demonstrate what Boas and 
Dobzhansky might have presupposed:  Even at the molecular level 
genetic variation is too plentiful and too widely disbursed to give 
biological standing to traditional racial divisions, let alone to 
privilege one over another, or to permit eugenic meddling by 
identifying “types” of people, such as criminals (Boas, 1911; 
Dobzhansky, 1941; Lewontin and Hubby, 1966; Lewontin, 1970, 
1972). 
Partly because of his conception of the duties of a scientist and 
partly because he thought that push-back against the fragile gains 
of the civil rights movement had raised the social and political 
stakes, Lewontin launched withering attacks on the mathematics, 
motives, and authority of those who in his view ignored or misread 
the evidence he had found.  These attacks were intense enough 
when they were directed against the anti-egalitarian social 
scientists Arthur Jensen and Richard Herrnstein.  But they were no 
less intense when Lewontin began hurling variations on the same 
arguments at his fellow evolutionary biologist, colleague, and 
department chair, Edward O. Wilson, who did not obviously 
deserve them, and his 1974 book Sociobiology.  Wilson had brought 
Lewontin (back) to Harvard from the University of Chicago in 1973 
to help him counter the growing influence of his unwelcome 
departmental colleague Watson, whom Wilson called “Caligula” 
(Wilson 1994, 219).  Understandably, he was surprised, 
disconcerted, and hurt when Lewontin turned on him (Seegerstrale 
2000).  
In defending himself, Wilson called attention to the rather 
hardline but anti-Stalinist and to that extent social democratic 
Marxism Lewontin had professed since his youth.  His charge was 
and is that Lewontin’s ideology, not scientific empiricism, was 
guiding his claims and distorting his arguments (Wilson to 
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Lewontin, January 5, 1975; Wilson, 1978).1  The accusation stuck.  
Even Lewontin’s admirers and collaborators have worried about it 
(Singh et al., 2001b, 5).  Robert Trivers, a Harvard biologist who 
from the start was sympathetic to Wilson’s Sociobiology, did not 
have to expect much blowback when not long ago he described 
Lewontin as “a man with great talents who often wasted them on 
foolishness, on preening and showing off, on shallow political 
thinking and on useless philosophical rumination while limiting his 
genetic work by assumptions congenial to his politics” (Trivers, 
2015). 
In this essay, I will shine a more positive light on Lewontin’s 
polemics by putting them in historical perspective.  I will do so with 
help from rhetorical approaches to scientific argumentation.  It is 
well known to rhetorical scholars, if less often to their colleagues in 
the philosophy and history of science, that in the give and take of 
controversy scientists effectively persuade both public audiences 
and their professional peers by appealing, in addition to logically 
concatenated evidence (logos), to their own authority (ethos), the 
emotions of their audiences (pathos), and the exigencies of specific 
situation (kairos).2 Rhetorical scholars of science also know that, 
like other rhetors, scientists tend over the course of their careers to 
favor as much as politicians or preachers one sort of argumentative 
strategy (topos) over others (Weaver, 1953).  My aim in appealing 
to rhetorical analysis is not to re-litigate point and counterpoint in 
the debates that marked Lewontin’s career.  Instead, it is to 
document, in the first instance, how fond he has been of the 
argument from his own authority and, second, to suggest that 
highlighting this characteristic shows why his Marxism may after 
all be in the service of science.  Even so, my aim is less to insist that 
he was right than to explain how he went about trying to persuade. 
                                                 
1 All quotations from Lewontin’s correspondence are from the 
papers of Richard C. Lewontin, American Philosophical Society, 
Philadelphia, PA.  A Mellon Emeritus Fellowship funded research in 
this archive.  This essay details, documents, and developments points 
sketched in Jackson and Depew, 2017.  My thanks to the Mellon 
Foundation and to John P. Jackson, Jr., who helped me interpret 
these sources and arguments.  He is not to be held responsible for the 
result.  
 
2 My stress in this essay is on ethos.  See Garver, 1995 on what 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric calls the proof (pistis) from the ethos or character 
of a speaker.  On the self-presentation or persona of the scientific 
expert, Keränen, 2010; Hartelius, 2011. 
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The tendency to stress his own authority first appears in 
Lewontin’s efforts to wrest control of Dobzhansky’s research 
program on the ground that his former mentor’s experimental and 
mathematical skills were inadequate to refute the strain of genetic 
determinism in molecular evolutionists.  After suggesting the 
technical reasons for this “anxiety of influence,” I will show why 
Lewontin’s criticisms took on a more political, and ultimately a 
more personal, tone in the 1970s.  Dobzhansky’s failure to 
dissociate himself far enough from the Behavior Genetics 
Association’s positive response to Jensen’s genetic explanation of 
the lower performance of African-American in IQ tests seemed to 
Lewontin to confirm weaknesses he had already spotted in 
Dobzhansky’s interpretation of the anti-racist and anti-eugenic 
research program they shared.  I go on to discuss Lewontin’s efforts 
to destroy the credibility of Herrnstein and Wilson in the light of his 
concerns about these weaknesses.  By recounting these episodes, I 
hope to suggest why Lewontin’s “dialectical biology,” as he and his 
frequent co-author Richard Levins call it, is simultaneously 
scientific and social-critical.  
How Lewontin Got His Scientific Mojo 
In the first third of the 20th century, the new science of Mendelian 
genetics was at loggerheads with Darwin’s stress on natural 
selection (Provine, 1970).  They were integrated in the 1920s and 
30s by shifting the discussion away from individual organisms to 
the level of interbreeding populations, which were modeled as 
statistical arrays and so were amenable to calculations of 
probability.  Population genetics mathematically tracks how the 
frequency of genotypes over multi-generational time shifts in 
populations of interbreeding organisms under the influence of 
various evolutionary factors, such as mutation, fixation of genes by 
chance in small populations (“genetic drift”), and, preeminently, 
natural selection.  The aspiration of the Modern Evolutionary 
Synthesis of the 1940s and 1950s was to unify all biological fields by 
recasting them in population-genetic terms (Huxley, 1942).  Of the 
founders of its American branch, Theodosius Dobzhansky, Ernst 
Mayr, George Gaylord Simpson, only the first was a geneticist.  The 
focal claim of his Genetics and the Origin of Species, which 
catalyzed the formation of the Synthesis, is that because 
environments are constantly shifting, not least in virtue of changes 
wrought by organisms themselves as they go about living, natural 
selection favors wherever it can the evolution of mechanisms that 
create and preserve genetic diversity that it can use later to keep 
populations adapted when environments change (Dobzhansky, 
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1941).  If the vast majority of lineages we see around us today 
possess such mechanisms it is because the others never got off the 
ground or have gone extinct.  
Prominent among diversity-preserving and hence diversity-
increasing mechanisms are the diploid chromosome we see in many 
animal lineages and its analogue in some plants, polyploidy.  
Mendel’s laws of inheritance were built, at first unwittingly, on 
diploidy.  They assume that each site or locus on a chromosome has 
room for two alternate forms of a gene (“alleles,” from Greek 
allêllos).  A single locus of a diploid chromosome might contain 
either two dominant alleles, or two recessives, or one of each, all 
drawn from a larger “gene pool” of alleles distributed across 
populations. Loci with two dominants and two recessives are called 
homozygotes.  The mixed configuration is dubbed heterozygotic.   
Unless natural selection and other forces of evolutionary change are 
at work, these three configurations will recur generation after 
generation in a fixed proportion: For every two heterozygotes, there 
will be one homozygote with two dominants and one with two 
recessives.3  Since evolutionary forces are constantly in play, 
however, this equilibrium state is almost always being disturbed.  
Dobzhansky focused on why the frequency of heterozygotes 
often climbs disproportionately above equilibrium in a population.  
The answer is heterozygote reproductive advantage or heterosis.  It 
explains the hybrid vigor that farmers have long noticed and seed 
companies commercially exploit.  The best-documented case is the 
spread of the heterozygote configuration of the alleles of red blood 
cells that confer protection against illness or death in populations 
afflicted by sickle cell anemia. = The biological world is highly 
dynamic.  What is adaptive is tied to and in turn affects 
environmental contingencies.  Thus in some situations, a double 
dominant, which constitutes the healthy “wild type” in species at 
most times, may actually lower reproductive output.  Similarly, it is 
possible for natural selection to amplify double recessives.  Still, 
Dobzhansky maintained that natural selection generally favors 
heterozygotes both because they enhance hybrid vigor and because 
the genetic variation banked in their recessive alleles might become 
adaptive when environments change.  By the beginning of the 1950s 
he was arguing that heterozygote superiority is itself an adaptive 
effect of natural selection.  It evolved in order to maintain a balance 
                                                 
3 This is so because two alleles in three possible configurations 
follows the quadratic equation: aa + 2ab + bb.  This is called the 
Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium Law, after two mathematicians who 
independently derived it in 1908. 
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between the current and prospective utility of alleles.  His graduate 
students were tasked with finding experimental evidence for this 
adaptationist version of the “balance hypothesis” (Beatty, 1987; 
Depew 2011). 
Diploidy and polyploidy are not the only means of generating 
genetic variation and making it available to natural selection.  
Watson and Crick’s 1953 discovery threw the emphasis on mutation 
in DNA sequences: the random substitution in someone’s genome 
of adenine for thymine in making an amino acid, for example.  Still, 
Dobzhansky was more impressed by mechanisms for generating 
variation in which a vast array of genetic diversity becomes 
available when segments of DNA invert their order or change their 
position on a chromosome.  For this reason, he claimed in 1959 
that, “Suppression of mutation process would probably have little 
effect on evolutionary plasticity for some time to come” (Tax and 
Callender, 1960, III, 115). 
Lewontin’s lasting claim to scientific fame, and the source of his 
ethos, is that in 1966 he found a way to substantiate an assumption 
of Dobzhansky’s view that natural selection maintains a balance 
between current and future utility.  With help from the 
experimentalist Jack Hubby, his colleague at the University of 
Chicago, he used gel electrophoresis to show that the amount of 
genetic variation found in proteins, the immediate products of DNA 
and RNA, is as heterozygotic as it is at the organismic level.  In gene 
pools there may be as many as eight or ten alleles for amino acids, 
the building blocks of protein, that can slot into either position at a 
diploid locus (Lewontin and Hubby, 1966). 
 It did not take Lewontin long to use this result to firm up a 
claim that had drawn him to Dobzhansky’s lab in the first place. 
Even at the molecular level the amount of heritable variation within 
conventionally designated human races is much higher than the 
amount of variation between them: 
Although there is variation between loci in their relative 
contributions, the average values show that 85 percent of 
human genetic diversity is within national populations 
and only 7.5 percent between nations within races and 
7.5 between major races . . . Since most of the world’s 
population is made of Chinese, Indians, Europeans, and 
the recently hybridized populations of South America, 
who vary less from each other than do small isolated 
groups, the correct proportion of human genetic 
variation that is within nations or tribes is [actually] 
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closer to 95 than to 85 percent (Lewontin 1974a, 155-
156).  
This result has held up.4 This being so, Lewontin’s point is that even 
on the genetic-reductionist terms favored by molecular biologists 
one must either demote the term ‘race’ to a social construction with 
no foundation in biology, as the anthropologist Ashley Montagu 
had long urged (Montagu, 1942), or redefine it in population-
genetic terms that carry none of the non-egalitarian implications of 
the conventional understanding of race, as Montagu’s sometime 
collaborator Dobzhansky argued (Jackson and Depew, 2017).  In 
the second case, it might well be that by the standards used to 
identify biological races in other species there are no races of 
human beings, a position first urged by Frank Livingstone and 
widely accepted by biological anthropologists to this day 
(Livingstone and Dobzhansky, 1962). 
Lewontin got the attention of his molecular colleagues.  “I was 
the [molecularists’] captured population geneticist,” he wryly noted 
in retrospect (Lewontin 1989, 40). In 1968, a fellow population-
geneticist who was visiting Caltech reported back on a lecture 
Lewontin had recently given to its hard-nosed molecular 
reductionists.  “They were impressed by your talk … especially 
[Max] Delbrück,” wrote James Crow.  “He would like more.  Can 
you send me some of your data or mss?” (Crow to Lewontin, March 
6, 1968; Lewontin et al. 2000, 39).  A month later Crow 
congratulated Lewontin on his election to the National Academy of 
Science (Crow to Lewontin, April 24, 1968). Lewontin declined the 
honor because of the Academy’s involvement in weapons work 
during the Vietnam War.  Still, he was pleased that he had 
“sideswiped” the molecular “bandwagon,” as he later put it 
(Lewontin et al. 2000, 35).  He was acutely aware that by the late 
1950s not just the balance hypothesis, but the entire field of 
population-genetic evolutionary studies might be verging on 
                                                 
4 Current estimates are that only 2.5% of the genetic variance in H. 
sapiens is between national or ethnic populations within conventional 
races and only 4.3% between conventional races.  Alan Templeton is 
the latest biological anthropologist to conclude that by most measures 
of genetic variance there is not enough discontinuity between human 
races to support the claim that there are any biological human races 
(Templeton, 2013, 6).  By these lights chimpanzees have three races, 
differences between which account for 30% of the total genetic 
variance (25% is usually taken to be necessary for positing a race).  
Lewontin’s results have been challenged by Edwards, 2003, but see 
Winther, 2014 for an argument claiming that what Edwards questions 
is slightly different from what Lewontin was addressing and how he 
addressed it. 
David Depew 8  Poroi 13,2 (January 2018) 
 
“collapse” in the face of the molecular juggernaut (Lewontin et al., 
2000, 35).  If he failed to validate Dobzhansky’s claims about how 
much and precisely how genetic variation is distributed in natural 
populations at the level of proteins a key line of defense against 
racism and eugenics would be breached.  
True, many molecularists held that most of the genetic variation 
in the structural gene products Lewontin uncovered is not subject 
to natural selection and so has no biological function at all, leaving 
the question of races and their purportedly unique adaptations 
moot.  They claimed it is fixed in populations by chance (Kimura, 
1968).  Lewontin had a healthy respect for the role of chance 
mutation in evolution.  Nonetheless, in his 1974 treatise The 
Genetics of Evolutionary Change he shifted the burden of proof to 
“neutral mutationism” or what several of its advocates called “non-
Darwinian evolution” by framing it as a disguised version of 
Hermann Muller’s claim that there is one and only one fit genotype 
for each locus (King and Jukes, 1969; Lewontin, 1974a).  Lewontin 
was implicating their neutralist opponents in Muller’s eugenic 
enthusiasms and in begging the question not only against balancing 
selection, but also against Lewontin’s own insistence that genetic 
fitness at any particular locus is sensitive to what is happening 
elsewhere in the genome as much as to even slight environmental 
changes (Lewontin, 1974a).  Lewontin’s “genetic relativity” signaled 
his early opposition to the notion that there are “genes for” this or 
that trait.  It also meant that he was suspicious of aspirations to 
manipulate them.  Even if “gene therapy” were to succeed, he 
suspected it would still carry eugenic implications and racist biases 
(Lewontin, 1993).   
Grateful for Lewontin’s help in dealing with the molecularists, 
supporting him in his running argument with Muller, and refuting 
racism once again, Dobzhansky told him The Genetics of 
Evolutionary Change was “a great book” (Dobzhansky to Lewontin, 
January 5, 1973).  But the very fact that Dobzhansky needed help 
seemed to intensify Lewontin’s growing sense of himself as a 
molecular and mathematical virtuoso and increasingly to lead him 
to dissociate himself from Dobzhansky’s technical inadequacies: his 
dependence on others to solve even the simplest problems in 
mathematical population genetics (Lewontin, 1989, 88-89); his 
failure to run proper tests of statistical significance on his 
experiments (Lewontin, 1995a); his use of examples rather than 
complete data sets as evidence for his interpretations of 
evolutionary phenomena (Lewontin, 1989, 91; 1995a, 93); his 
willingness to discard unwelcome experimental results (Lewontin, 
1989, 33; 1995a, 93); and his tendency to turn the adaptive 
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superiority of heterozygotes into something close to a definitional 
truth when experiments appeared to challenge it (Lewontin, 1989, 
97; 1995, 97; Lewontin et al., 2000, 31).  
The affective aspects of his assertion of scientific authority are 
recorded in correspondence that makes for painful reading.  When 
he came to Columbia as a graduate student Lewontin idolized 
Dobzhansky (Lewontin 1989, 2).  As early as 1963, however, his 
mentor sensed that for some time “There has not been a case when 
anything that I said, wrote, or done has met with your approval… I 
am so used to your disapproval that it no longer hurts me as much 
as it used to” (Dobzhansky to Lewontin, May 7, 1963).  Responding 
to a letter in which Lewontin congratulated him on receiving an 
honorary degree, Dobzhansky wrote, “Your congratulations are 
greatly appreciated as [is] any sort or kind of approval from you” 
(Dobzhansky to Lewontin, December 18, 1964).  Nonetheless, in 
1970 Lewontin complained that Dobzhansky was slighting him by 
strenuously attempting to find a suitable appointment and 
professional honors, such as election to the National Academy of 
Science from which Lewontin had resigned, for Bruce Wallace, a 
former Dobzhansky student whose elegant experiments had done 
much to support the balance hypothesis.  Lewonin had to be 
reassured that he was Dobzhansky’s best student and reminded 
that he was capable of looking after his own interests in ways 
Wallace was not.  “[Bruce] lacks your magnificent verbal ability,” 
Dobzhansky reminded Lewontin.  “He has not fully overcome his 
folksy early background” (Dobzhansky to Lewontin, October 21, 
1970).  Lewontin was close to Wallace.  Why he could not see this 
for himself until Dobzhansky pointed it out is hard to grasp.  In a 
handwritten note he apologized, blaming his “selfish” involvement 
in his own career and a life-long tendency to “criticize my betters” 
that he didn’t really seem to regret (Lewontin to Dobzhansky, 
October 24, 1970). 
This is not the last we will see of Lewontin’s anxiety of influence.  
Dobzhansky and Lewontin’s correspondence shows that, despite 
mutual misunderstandings, genuine disagreements, and emotional 
dustups like the one I have recounted, they continued to work in 
tandem to advance and defend the research program they shared 
until Dobzhansky’s death.  That occurred in 1975, just as Lewontin’s 
disputes with Herrnstein and Wilson were reaching a boiling point.  
Thereafter, his privately nursed objections to Dobzhansky’s ideas 
morphed into a growing habit of disparaging him in public.  Why? 
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Behavior Genetics: Jensen, Dobzhansky, 
Lewontin 
The Behavior Genetics Association (BGA) met formally for first 
time in 1971.  Its aim was to take up the hereditarian case for 
human behavioral traits after the transformation of the American 
Eugenics Society into the Genetics Society of America in response 
to the postwar discrediting of eugenics (Barkan, 1992).  For this 
reason, even at the risk of protesting too much, the BGA’s rhetoric 
placed great emphasis on the scientific objectivity of its research 
(Panofsky, 2014).  Dobzhansky allowed himself to be elected its first 
President.  Those who nominated him believed that his eminence 
would lend luster to their cause.  For his part, Dobzhansky’s goal 
was to commend to the BGA the research program that he and his 
Columbia colleague L. C. Dunn had set afoot in their Institute for 
the Study of Human Variation. 
Against a background in which blood types were construed as 
carrying risks when transfused across conventionally demarcated 
races--as recently as World War II wounded white soldiers were not 
given blood from African Americans--the Institute helped map the 
worldwide distribution of blood types and show that, while 
populations carry different proportions of types like O or A, blood 
of the same type can be successfully transfused to anyone.  Another 
project focused on genetic diseases.  Recessive genes are recessive 
for a reason.  Double recessives will often show up as “inborn errors 
of metabolism,” as the early twentieth-century physician Archibald 
Garrod called them.  Dobzhansky and Dunn searched for genetic 
disorders that statistically plague small and reproductively isolated 
populations.  The dominant strain in the BGA, however, was quite 
different.  It was to find heritable differences in individuals.  “The 
main business of behavior geneticists has always been individual, 
not group differences,” wrote one of its founders, “and the day-to-
day research of most behavior geneticists questions about group 
differences are at best an unwelcome distraction” (Loehlin, 2009, 
7).  Many behavioral geneticists focused on studies of twins 
separated at birth to show inherited similarities that manifested 
themselves in individuals raised in what they presumed to be 
relevantly different environments. 
Although Dobzhansky’s effort to set his new colleagues straight 
about “population thinking” met with little success, these tensions 
seemed manageable until the publication in 1969 of a study of racial 
differences in IQ in Harvard Educational Review. The psychologist 
Arthur Jensen’s answer to the question his title asked, “How Much 
Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?” was: not much 
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(Jensen, 1969).  The article resuscitated the case for racial 
differences in intelligence in an already vexed rhetorical situation in 
which Lyndon Johnson’s push for a Great Society was putting teeth 
into the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court 
decision, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965. 
Jensen argued that IQ is an objectively measurable and strongly 
heritable trait and endorsed studies showing that, while African 
Americans as a group outscore whites from an early age in motor 
ability and are comparable in associative learning, they fall between 
11 and 15 points behind whites in terms of a measure of conceptual 
and inferential intelligence called “g” by the English psychologist 
Charles Spearman.  Jensen inflamed matters further by inferring 
that the recently passed Head Start Program, which uses early 
education to raise the problem-solving intelligence of minorities 
and help them gain access as adults to the skilled work that confers 
middle class status in America, was a waste of time, money, and 
effort:  
The evidence so far suggests the tentative conclusion 
that the pay-off of preschool and compensatory 
programs in terms of IQ gains is small … The techniques 
for raising intelligence per se, in the sense of g, probably 
lie more in the province of the biological sciences than in 
psychology and education (Jensen 1969, 108).   
In spite of Jensen’s statistical competence, which he conceded, 
Lewontin had reason to smell a rat (Lewontin, 1970; 1976b).  As a 
visiting scholar in the UK, Jensen had come under the influence of 
the hereditarian psychologist Hans Eysenck and Eysenck's mentor, 
Cyril Burt.  These people passed as reputable scientists until Gould, 
with characteristic story-telling verve, showed that Burt’s data were 
invented (Gould, 1981).  Having returned to the US, Jenson was 
encouraged to write his article by the physicist-engineer William 
Shockley.  After doing research that led to the invention of the 
transistor, Shockley began a second career as a latter-day eugenics 
advocate and outspoken proponent of the genetic inferiority of 
blacks to whites in intelligence.  He had no professional training in 
biology or any social science.  In defending his claim when it came 
under attack, Jensen tended to rely on conservative polemicists 
such as Charles Murray of the American Enterprise Institute, who 
later co-authored with Herrnstein a best-selling Jensenist tract, The 
Bell Curve (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994).  As late as 2005 Jensen 
was still claiming that the expansion of opportunities afforded 
African-Americans by liberal policies had affected his original 
findings not a whit (Jensen, 2005).  
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Fear that Jensen’s article might be taken seriously galvanized 
opposition from a coalition of left-leaning student activists, 
professors, and citizens who were already mobilized to resist the 
draft and oppose the Vietnam War.  Student radicals of that era 
believed the war had been brought on by people whom the 
journalist David Halberstam called with dripping irony “the best 
and the brightest:” defense intellectuals, denizens of think tanks 
like the Rand Corporation, academic game-theorists, and the like 
(Halberstam, 1972).  The New Left assimilated Jensen to this 
picture.  He was picketed and shouted down when he spoke at 
Berkeley and elsewhere.  In his early years back at Harvard 
Lewontin spent a considerable amount of time developing 
arguments to support this stance in conjunction with the local 
branch of a national inter-campus network, modeled to some extent 
on Students for a Democratic Society, called Science for the People.  
His theme was that empirical evidence that rises to the level of 
scientific proof is hard to come by and that those who are not aware 
of the ideological distortions to which scientific inquiry is prone, or 
who through self-interest ignore them, are likely to jump to 
conclusions and light on hypotheses that support entrenched 
misdistributions of power, not least endemic, if sometimes subtle, 
racism.  When a Statement signed by fifty members of the 
American Psychological Association, including a sprinkling of 
Nobel laureates, appeared in American Psychologist lamenting “the 
climate of suppression, punishment, and defamation of scientists 
who emphasized the role of heredity in human behavior,” it was 
met with a Lewontin-influenced Resolution Against Racism that 
denied the very possibility that Jensen’s work could have any 
scientific value (Page, 1972).  Signed by over a thousand people, it 
was published on September 28, 1973 as a half-page advertisement 
in the New York Times. 
Seven members of the BGA had signed the statement in 
American Psychologist.  As a result, its leadership was forced to 
determine how best to insulate their newborn field, sensitive as it 
was about its scientific credibility, from the Resolution Against 
Racism (Panofsky, 2014).  Dobzhansky used his address as 
outgoing President to articulate a via media between genetic 
determinism and environmental-cultural explanations of human 
traits (Dobzhansky, 1976; Dobzhansky to Osborne, May 7, 1973).  
He undercut racial essentialism by stating that even if some genetic 
markers are associated with nationality or race myriad others are 
not.  He pointed out that behavioral traits are linked to many genes 
and are highly sensitive to even slight environmental changes.  He 
argued that heritability is not equivalent to and does not entail 
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fixity or fate.  He warned that projecting population-level statistics 
onto individuals is perilous and pointed out that phenotypically 
flexible heterozygotes express themselves in too many ways to allow 
simple links between genotype and phenotype.   
All these things being so, Dobzhansky stressed the importance 
of carrying on research into behavioral genetics in ways that follow 
the principles of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis.  The BGA’s 
new leaders did not accept these principles, however, and so 
rejected their President’s input into a proposed Statement on 
Jensen to be issued in the BGA’s name (Osborne to Dobzhansky, 
May 11, 1973; Loehlin to Dobzhansky, May 11, 1973).  Instead, they 
opted for a harder line, circulating among themselves a draft 
statement in which they drew distinctions between “racial 
differences and racist ideas” and between “ideas and actions” in 
order to say that Jensen’s freedom of inquiry was being violated.  
They went on affirm the right and desirability of conducting 
research on whether there are “genes for” this or that behavioral 
trait that might be attributed to individuals and are more prevalent 
in races.  Although a shorter Statement was released, its message 
was that significant cognitive and behavioral differences between 
African-Americans and whites are a live possibility.  The conception 
of race at work was conventional, not population-genetic.  In vain 
Dobzhansky complained that although he agreed with the 
statement “as far as it goes” it should also have contained an 
explicit repudiation of racism.  “All my life I have been fighting the 
prostitution of biology by racists,” he told them (Dobzhansky to 
Jensen and Page, January 17, 1972; Dobzhansky to Lewontin, 
January 5, 1973).  
Among those urging the BGA to take a harder line in defense of 
Jensen was Sandra Scarr-Salpatek, a member of a group of twin 
studies specialists at the University of Minnesota.  In a letter to one 
of the BSA’s founders, she wrote, “I am not sure why the number of 
BGA members who signed the letter should be distressing.  It seems 
particularly appropriate for many of our members to lend support 
to a statement on the genetic factors in behavior and the necessity 
of free inquiry” (Scarr-Salpatek to Osborne, May 7, 1973).  Badly 
misreading him, Scarr-Salpatek asked Lewontin to sign the draft 
statement and, in view of his prestige as Dobzhansky’s heir, allow 
his name to appear as its co-author (Scarr-Salpatek to Lewontin, 
May 4, 1973).  Lewontin replied: 
I am afraid I cannot possibly associate myself with the 
sentiments in your letter or a joint statement … You have 
been taken in by a false issue.  The issue is not and never 
has been one of academic freedom … The simple and 
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direct fact is that genetics is being used as a weapon in a 
social battle and that we disarm ourselves completely if 
we allow that battle to be fought on the terms laid down 
by racists … The … distinction between ideas and actions 
[is] metaphysical nonsense (Lewontin to Scarr-Salpatek, 
May 8, 1973).   
In saying this, Lewontin was positioning himself to Dobzhansky’s 
left.  To be sure, in his Presidential Address to the BGA Dobzhansky 
repeated the message he had been sending ever since 1937:  It 
makes no sense to talk about genetic and environmental factors 
without recognizing that in populations gene, organism, and 
environment are as dynamically inter-defined as speed, distance, 
and time in Galileo’s equations.  Apart from these relationships 
these terms have no scientific meaning.  Lewontin credited 
Dobzhansky with having made this key point.  “It is to 
Dobzhansky,” he later wrote,  
that I owe my preoccupation with a correct relationship 
between organism, gene, and environment.  Dobzhansky 
constantly reiterated that the fitnesses of genotypes are 
dependent on the environment and that … one could 
make no prediction whatsoever of which genotypes 
would get favorable and which unfavorable in a new 
environment (Lewontin, 1989, 25, 44).  
Nonetheless, for Dobzhansky to acknowledge that the BGA’s 
statement might be even partially right was according to Lewontin 
to lend credibility to a position that deserved no public or 
professional hearing at all, as he made clear to Scarr-Saltapek.  Ten 
years previously Dobzhansky had taken a stance against the 
physical anthropologist Carleton Coon’s The Origin of Races not 
unlike Lewontin’s view of Jensen.  It and its author deserved only to 
be discredited (Collopy 2015; Jackson and Depew, 2017).  I can find 
no evidence that Lewontin reminded Dobzhansky of this fact, but I 
do find evidence that he saw Dobzhansky’s dealings with the BGA 
as a retreat from his own principles. 
For some time, Lewontin had taken exception to an image 
Dobzhansky began deploying in the late 1950s according to which 
changing environments “challenge” Mendelian populations to 
“solve the problems” they pose to organisms by shifting gene 
frequencies in an adaptive direction over trans-generational time.  
This trope, according Lewontin and his Marxist tutor and 
collaborator Richard Levins, implies that “the organism is molded 
to fit into a preexistent niche just as a key is cut and filed to fit into 
a lock” (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, 98).  It portrays living beings as 
David Depew 15  Poroi 13,2 (January 2018) 
 
passive objects that are as mechanistically shaped by external, pre-
existing environments as they were for Herbert Spencer, the ur-
theorist of “social Darwinism.”  Lewontin began arguing that 
organisms are not a disaggregated collection of adapted traits 
selected by their environments, but holistic beings that construct 
their own niches by evolving the agency to exploit them and live in 
them (Lewontin, 1982; Odling-Smee et al., 2003).  In this spirit, he 
remarked that in the late eighteenth century Jean-Baptiste 
Lamarck, although he had the wrong explanation for it, correctly 
described the active, striving, self-making agency of organisms 
(Levins and Lewontin, 1985, 85).  Not coincidentally, Lamarck 
supported the social mobility promised by the French Revolution.  
Lewontin believed that the fissure between environment, 
development, and gene implied by Dobzhansky’s challenge-
response model opened wider in his Mankind Evolving 
(Dobzhansky, 1962).  In this influential book, his former mentor 
moved beyond opposing genetic arguments for eugenics and 
racism, which he rightly took to be a yoked pair,5 to arguing that the 
primacy of balancing selection in populations offers evolutionary 
support for the liberal-democratic pluralism that was beginning to 
take hold in postwar America (Dobzhansky, 1962; Beatty, 1994).  
On the balance hypothesis, he maintained, freedom to choose one’s 
occupation and one’s mate, including interracial marriage, will 
make for far fitter populations than any kind of eugenic tinkering or 
caste-making.  That is because on Dobzhansky’s theory 
heterozygote superiority, and with it hybrid vigor, environmentally 
sensitive phenotypic flexibility, and genotypic capacity to use stored 
variation to adapt to new circumstances, will increasingly prevail 
when freedom to marry whomever one wishes and generally do 
what one wishes are politically protected. 
But Dobzhansky also argued in Mankind Evolving that only 
under liberal-democratic conditions can genetic causes be 
separated from environmental effects (Dobzhansky 1962, 1973).6 
                                                 
5 In the postwar period, there were many authoritative geneticists 
who believed that repudiation of racism made scientific eugenics 
possible for the first time.  Among them were Julian Huxley and 
Hermann Muller.  
 
6 Dobzhansky was arguing against Hermann Muller, a geneticist 
he respected but who held that only the social leveling of communist 
societies, by making the environment uniform, will reveal the true 
effects of genes (Beatty, 1989, 1994; Jackson and Depew, 2017, 121-
123).  
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The causes of genetic diseases like Tays-Sachs or thalassemia are 
covered over by caste formation in traditional societies.  In such 
societies, you cannot disentangle the effects of social prejudice or 
political regimentation from biological inheritance.  By contrast, 
Dobzhansky maintained that in liberal democratic societies genetic 
diseases can be seen as genetic and treated as such.  The reasoning 
is as follows.  Given the proportions in which they recur in 
populations, wherever there are heterozygotes there will be a 
predictable proportion of double recessives, some lethal.   So if 
liberal democracy favors heterozygotes it will still bring genetic 
diseases in its train.  Perhaps with help from a reformed BGS, 
Dobzhansky wanted to track the incidence of these diseases, 
especially in liberalizing societies, because they would help confirm 
his balance hypothesis.  But he also recognized that the inevitability 
of genetic diseases raises difficult questions about how such 
societies should cope with them.7 We continue to struggle with 
these questions.  The Eugenics Society of America may have 
become the American Genetics Society, but many people suspected, 
and indeed still suspect, that its liberal, informed-consent approach 
to genetic medicine still carries traces of eugenic thinking (Paul, 
1998).  
Lewontin is one of those people.  He found remnants of eugenic 
thinking in Dobzhansky’s view that genes are not just correlated 
with but are the proper causes of genetic diseases (Levins and 
Lewontin, 1985, 109-122).8 He concluded that by thinking of genes 
as causes of pathological conditions his former mentor was letting 
his liberal politics weaken or betray his own principle that gene, 
organism, and environment are dynamically intertwined.  
Identifying genes as causes combined with Dobzhansky’s model of 
environments as pre-existing niches into which organisms are 
inserted in ways that further fractured the bond between these 
factors.  This being so, Lewontin felt he had to rescue Dobzhansky’s 
                                                 
7 It also caused Dobzhansky, who was religious--“I am a 
Christian,” he told a correspondent (Dobzhansky to J. Greene, Nov. 
25, 1961)--to worry in his last, illness-plagued decade about what God 
was up to when he allowed such a two-edged sword as heterosis to be 
the primary motor of evolutionary advance.  See Dobzhansky, 1967. 
 
8 The issue turns on what Dobzhansky may have meant by leaving 
room for what he called “this much of eugenics” in allowing for 
research into how to eliminate double recessives from the gene pool 
without disturbing the creative work of heterosis or individual choice 
(Dobzhansky, 1962, 332-33; 1973, 105; see Jackson and Depew, 2017, 
121-22). 
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“biology of democracy” from its founder’s backsliding by 
envisioning both biology and democracy differently.   
Lewontin’s response to the problem of genetic diseases has been 
to make more than his mentor of the fact that a truly egalitarian 
society--for him a social democracy, in which the self-undermining 
tendencies and injustices of liberalism’s free market capitalism are 
acknowledged and either abolished or compensated for--can 
obviate or mitigate many problems ascribed to the power of genes-
gone-bad by providing universal access to everything from 
eyeglasses to dietary regimes to good housing that will change the 
environments in which genes express, or fail to express, themselves.  
If they are expressed, they will be treated fairly (Lewontin, 1993).   
When Lewontin says that human traits are “not in our genes” he 
can easily be misunderstood (Lewontin et al., 1984).  He does not 
mean that they are the results of learning and cultural transmission 
alone.  He means that the habit of dividing causal factors into a 
binary between “nurture and nature” is inconsistent with our most 
well founded knowledge of evolutionary biology, social dynamics, 
and their interaction.  That biology is one thing and social facts 
another is almost an imperative in our discursive milieu.  No sooner 
do people announce a solution to the nurture-nature divide than 
they repeat it (Keller, 2010).  Things do not appear that way, 
however, to Lewontin and Levins, for whom Marx and Engels’ 
dialectical materialism treats culture and biology as a monistic 
whole and so takes seriously the idea that social-political changes 
can alleviate suffering far more effectively than dualistically 
conceived, industrially financed, and unfairly applied gene therapy 
(Levins and Lewontin, 1985; Lewontin, 1993).9 To us something 
seems wrong with the notion that we can affect biology by passing 
out eyeglasses.  But, Lewontin writes, “Changes in sanitation, public 
health, and disease control have reduced the infant mortality rates 
of disadvantaged urban Americans well below those of even the 
richest members of seventeenth century society” (Lewontin, 1970, 
7).  This lesson, he said, should always be borne in mind. 
Lewontin was nurturing these arguments even while serving as 
the principal editor of Dobzhansky’s most important scientific 
papers, offering him congratulations on being awarded the National 
Medal of Science, and taking a hand in nominating him for a Nobel 
                                                 
9 For Lewontin Descartes is the paradigmatic bad guy who  
introduces non-materialistic and individualistic conceptions of the 
soul, mechanistic notions of the body, and a dualistic gulf between 
them (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, 1, 82, 133; Lewontin, 1993). 
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Prize (Dobzhansky, 1981; Dobzhansky 1974c; Lewontin to 
Dobzhansky, November 14, 1964).  Still, it is probably no accident 
that Dobzhansky first sensed Lewontin pulling away from him soon 
after Mankind Evolving appeared and that this distance intensified 
in the mid 1970s when Lewontin was grappling with Jensen, 
Herrnstein, and Wilson.  The last glimpse we have of the two 
together shows Lewontin berating Dobzhansky with a convoluted 
argument taxing him with the genetic determinism he had spent his 
career opposing.  If Dobzhansky is right about recessives, he 
insisted, even heterozygotes will not be as phenotypically plastic as 
their most vocal advocate touted them as being (Lewontin et al. 
2000, 30; Lewontin 1989, 29-30). 
This dispute took place in 1974 on a fruit fly hunting expedition 
in Anza Borrego Desert State Park in California, not too far from 
the San Bernardino Mountains where some forty years earlier 
Dobzhansky had begun his field research on the humble and 
surprisingly diverse organism on which almost all his subsequent 
claims were founded.  Lewontin says he remembered the occasion 
because, city-boy that he was, he sprained his ankle in the course of 
trying to pin genetic determinism on Dobzhansky.  Absorbed in his 
own argument, he wasn’t watching where he was going (Lewontin 
et al. 2000, 30; Lewontin 1989, 29-30).  The outdoorsy 
Dobzhansky did fine under this peripatetic assault even though he 
was suffering from the advanced leukemia that would lead to his 
death only a year later.   
After Dobzhansky’s death, Lewontin wrote several only 
sporadically critical appreciations of his lifework (Lewontin, 1974c, 
1989, 1994).  In a volume meant to honor him twenty years after his 
death, however, he called him a “theorist without tools” (Lewontin 
1995a).  He meant that Dobzhansky lacked the mathematical and 
experimental skills around which Lewontin had by then formed for 
himself a persona that to his mind was better able to manage the 
scientific underpinnings of the anti-racist, anti-eugenicist values he 
and Dobzhansky shared in a rhetorical situation in which those 
values were under renewed attack.   By 2000, Lewontin was 
offhandedly remarking that Dobzhansky could “barely add 2 + 2” 
(Lewontin et al. 2000, 29).  A righteous crusader was sallying forth 
to slay monsters.  And he was mounted on a very high horse.  
Lewontin Takes on Herrnstein 
Lewontin’s blunt-talking, science-respecting, politically censorious 
persona became fully visible in his attack on the social psychologist 
Richard Herrnstein, which began almost as soon as he became 
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Alexander Agassiz Professorship of Zoology at Harvard in 1973, and 
so Herrnstein’s colleague.  Piggybacking on Jensen, Herrnstein had 
argued in an article in The Atlantic that the increasingly 
meritocratic political system of the US would eventually result in a 
class structure that mirrors genetically based IQ scores (Herrnstein, 
1971).  Lewontin was incensed not just because Herrnstein was a 
Jensenist, but also because he was blundering into Lewontin’s area 
of expertise: how evolution structures populations over time, 
including human populations.  He challenged Herrnstein to a 
debate.  “My purpose,” he informed him in a letter replying to 
Herrnstein’s wary inquiry about why Lewontin was picking a fight,  
is in some small way to counteract the rubbish that you 
and others have been producing. I do not accuse you of 
being primarily racist; I do not think you are. Your 
purpose is to convince people that their position in 
society is biologically determined in large part.  [But] 
since in America black people are disproportionally 
represented in the lower classes, people will believe that 
you think black people are genetically inferior.  You may 
say they are special, but you have no proof of that either.  
You have no particle of evidence one way or the other.  
You are a political propagandist masquerading as a 
scientist.  I will continue to struggle against you in any 
way at my command.  P.S. Why did you copy 
[Lewontin’s chairman] E. O. Wilson and Dean [Henry] 
Rosovky?  Did you imagine they would chastise me?  I 
shall let you know (Lewontin to Herrnstein, August 27, 
1973).  
Herrnstein sued Lewontin for painting him as a racist in public 
while in their private correspondence he claimed only that others 
would inevitably construe Lewontin’s research as racist.  To 
Herrnstein this meant that he had been defamed: publicly 
characterized in ways known by the offender to be false (Herrnstein 
to Lewontin, Sept 10, 1973).  The suit didn’t go anywhere; courts are 
generally loath to intervene in the obscure quarrels of academics.  
But in the course of bringing the lawyer he had retained up to 
speed, Lewontin remarked that Herrnstein “is threatened by my 
expertise … I have a high status in the field and have not hesitated 
to trade on it to discredit the pseudo-science being peddled by 
Herrnstein, Jensen et al.” (Lewontin to Sidney Schreiberg 1973, 
reordered).   Herrnstein didn’t budge in response to this display of 
ethos.  He went on to co-author with the conservative political 
polemicist Murray his suspiciously best-selling The Bell Curve 
(Murray and Herrnstein, 1984).  It can plausibly be maintained, 
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however, that Lewontin did more or less permanently shift the 
burden of proof onto Jensen and Herrnstein by throwing his weight 
around.  
Lewontin claims that he became aware of “the immense 
importance of status,” and hence of the argument from ethos, when, 
testifying in a trial in 1979, his word as a “named professor at 
Harvard” was given more weight than that of an expert witness 
from the University of South Carolina (Lewontin et al., 2000, 59).  
We see a clear example of this strategy in his reply to some 
sociologists whose statistical analysis of the self-reported sexual 
practices of American men and women he had taken to task: 
Although a biologist, I have a graduate degree in 
mathematical statistics and have taught the subject for 
forty years.  About 10% of my technical publications, 
including a textbook of statistics, have been devoted to 
problems of statistical sampling, estimation, and 
hypothesis testing.  More important, my biological work 
must be classified as methodological, my chief 
contribution to the field having been an analysis of the 
deep epistemological difficulties posed by the data of 
evolutionary genetics and the introduction of new 
experimental approaches specifically designed to 
overcome these ambiguities.  Finally, my work on 
epistemological problems, produced both alone and 
together with philosophers of science, appears in 
standard philosophical journals.  Whatever may be at 
issue here, it is not competence (Lewontin, 1995b). 
Lewontin is a man of the Enlightenment.  For him experimentally 
acquired scientific knowledge is about the best thing humans have 
produced, in part because it is the best guide to public policy.  But 
having found a bit of it he knows how hard it is to acquire.  He is 
also aware that the history of science, and not least of evolutionary 
biology, demonstrates that the gap between what scientists claim 
and what they actually prove is filled with interpretative stuffing 
that invariably supports not just old prejudices, but repressive 
distributions of political and economic power (Depew 2013).  There 
is nothing worthier of suspicion than assurances that deviations 
from good methodology and fidelity to data may have been true of 
yesterday’s science, but not today’s.  Look at claims of this sort 
made a hundred or even twenty years ago, however, and at best you 
will find fruitful discoveries mixed with fanciful and overly 
ambitious misinterpretations of them along with a generous 
helping of falsehoods that perpetuate biases and injustices that 
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science can and should combat. Why shouldn’t the same be true 
today, or of any today? (Laudan, 1981).10 
In light of such considerations Lewontin built something like 
the following reasoning into the persona he forged for himself as 
Dobzhansky’s usurping heir.  Those who naively presume that 
science is inherently transparent and progressive are more likely to 
fall into error than those who admit its entanglement in their 
society’s deep-seated discursive tendencies to justify social 
injustices by attributing them either to how God or nature arranges 
things (Lewontin 1993, 3, 7).  An example is Lewontin’s claim that 
the large gap between the equality that liberal capitalist democracy 
promises its citizens and what it actually delivers is rationalized by 
widely disseminating and having everyone internalize the belief 
that “the position of those without power is the inevitable outcome 
of their own innate deficiencies,” in recent times their genetic 
differences.  If “nothing can be done about it,” it is because a 
supposedly “natural sorting process” ranging over differential 
capacities “is to decide who gets the status, wealth and power and 
who does not” (Lewontin 1993, 20, rearranged).  Lewontin rightly 
pins this presupposition on Herrnstein and his “meritocratic 
sorting process” (Lewontin, 1993, 21).  But the shift to an ideal of 
equality of opportunity in postwar liberal democracies rather than 
to a more socialist equality of result implicated Dobzhansky too.  In 
Mankind Evolving he rejected equality of result as utopian and 
defended equality of opportunity as more or less defining 
democracy (Dobzhansky, 1962).   
Occasionally, Lewontin’s censoriousness has led him to shift 
from what's wrong with other people’s arguments to what’s wrong 
with other people.  Dobzhansky, we are told, was imperious to his 
wife (Lewontin et al. 2000).  Watson’s investment in genetic 
technology companies links his crude genetic reduction with greed 
(Lewontin, 1991, 51-2, 75).  Nothing in Lewontin’s argument about 
how society systematically impinges on science entails, however, 
that the tendency to insert ideology into the space between one’s 
evidence and one’s conclusion need be anything more than 
unwitting.  Lewontin does himself no favors when he finds 
character faults and bad intentions in his opponents.  Excessive 
appeal to the argument from ethos encourages efforts to undermine 
the ethos of others.  
                                                 
10 An extreme version of this so-called “pessimistic meta-
induction” is the Social Constructionist claim that scientific objectivity 
is illusory; what prevails at any time and place is a function of a 
theory’s ability to justify existing or prospective social orders.   I do 
not accept this argument. 
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Lewontin and Wilson: Is Adaptationism Racist? 
Unlike Jensen and Herrnstein, the Harvard entomologist E. O. 
Wilson is an adherent of the Modern Synthesis, like Lewontin.  
Wilson first got to know him when in the early 1960s they 
attempted, together with Levins and a talented ecologist named 
Robert MacArthur, to integrate ecology into the Synthesis (Wilson, 
1994, 252-31; Erickson 2015).  They made some progress 
(MacArthur and Wilson, 1967).  Still, Wilson’s most abiding 
ambition was to “extend population biology and evolutionary 
theory to social organization” (Wilson 1978, x).  The ambition was 
well motivated.  If the Modern Synthesis was to triumph it would 
have to find a way to dispose of the long-standing objection that, 
while Darwinian natural selection can explain competition, it can’t 
explain the cooperation we find in social species, including our 
own.  
Wilson endorsed a solution proposed by William Hamilton, who 
calculated that social insects, including the ants Wilson studies, are 
more likely to evolve cooperative role-division because they are all 
members of a class, Hymenoptera, whose odd chromosomal 
structure makes it easier to evolve sterile and hence self-sacrificing 
castes without threatening the reproductive chances of the species 
but, on the contrary, enhancing it through division of labor.   The 
argument depends on the linked notions of “inclusive fitness” and 
“kin selection.”  The first measures reproductive success not just by 
an organism’s genetic contribution to its immediate offspring, but 
to the offspring of brothers, sisters, and in ever-more-diluted 
proportion their offspring.  The second means that natural selection 
can favor adaptations that benefit not just individuals, but close 
relatives.  In Sociobiology Wilson summarized evidence showing 
that these ideas are in play in natural populations of social insects11 
(Wilson, 1975). 
The relevance of this claim to the problem of human 
cooperation is doubtful, since we are not social insects and our 
chromosomes are straightforwardly diploid.  So, at the end of his 
book Wilson appealed to “reciprocal altruism,” which depends on 
                                                 
11 In 2010, Wilson withdrew kin selectionism as an explanation of 
caste dynamics in ants (Nowak et al., 2010).  Forms of group selection 
that were developed in response to Sociobiology, he judged, made for 
a better fit with the evidence.  This belated admission had the effect, if 
not the intention, of burnishing the reputation for being an honest 
empiricist that Wilson began cultivating, perhaps in response to 
Lewontin’s attack, but also reinforces Lewontin’s assertion that when 
he wrote Sociobiology Wilson was bewitched by ideology.  Lewontin, 
too, embraces some forms of group selection. 
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anticipated rewards, to apply kin selection to humans.   This 
concept was championed by Wilson’s Harvard colleague Robert 
Trivers, who went on to develop other theorems that were soon 
incorporated into the emerging field of sociobiology and its 
successor program, evolutionary psychology (Trivers, 1971).  One 
such idea is “parental investment.”  It maintains that the degree of 
care expended on offspring is proportioned to the scarcity of 
genetic resources allocated to the task (Trivers, 1972).  On this 
theorem, the supposed natural promiscuity of males and the 
supposed female instinct to nurture are traced to the fact that 
mammalian eggs and the genes they contain are scarce while sperm 
is not a limiting resource.  Any man has millions of them.  An 
implication is that the hostility between human tribes may be 
moderated by the elaborate exogenous marriage exchanges 
documented by anthropologists, but beyond the charmed circle of 
genetic relatedness it will be endemic.  
Wilson might have expected Lewontin’s praise for defending the 
consistency of Darwinism with cooperation.  Had not Sociobiology 
given the lie to the Hobbesian conception of human nature as self-
centered, individualistic, competitive, and prone to violence, which 
Marx himself had spotted as a capitalist prejudice marring Darwin’s 
Origin of Species?  Sociobiology also beat back the “naked ape” 
hypothesis, which takes up Konrad Lorenz’s theory of aggression as 
a sudden, unstoppable instinctual discharge whenever any 
perceived enemy comes into sight (Segerstrale 2000, 28, 95; Lorenz 
1966; Morris 1967).  We are by nature cooperative, says Wilson, at 
least with our kin.  
Accordingly, Wilson was taken aback when he discovered that in 
an office a floor below his own Lewontin had been composing and 
was distributing to anyone who wanted it a “white paper” setting 
out the case against Sociobiology on behalf of a hastily convened 
Sociobiology Study Group (SSG) made up of local academics who 
had been keeping an eye on Jensen and Hernnstein for Science for 
the People.  Lewontin was a busy man in the year after Sociobiology 
was published.  In addition to keeping the wheels of the SSG 
turning, he co-wrote a rebuttal of a letter in Science favoring 
behavior genetics and sociobiology that the editor repeatedly 
refused to publish because “it was so full of rancor” (Philip Abelson 
to Lewontin, June 17, 1976); delivered a paper at the Philosophy of 
Science Association’s Spring, 1976 meeting entitled “Sociobiology--
A Caricature of Darwinism” (Lewontin, 1976a); and wrote a 
negative reader report of a manuscript on the weaknesses of 
behavior genetics on the ground that it didn’t hit the ideological 
offenses of its target hard enough (Segerstrale, 2000, 18, 28-30).   
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In “Sociobiology--A Caricature of Darwinism,” Lewontin argued 
for what on its face seems an implausible claim: that Wilson, a 
straight-up liberal supporter of civil rights, should be charged with 
the same ideological sins as Herrnstein, Jensen, and the BGA 
(Lewontin, 1976a; Wilson, 1994, 338-339).  One might see racism 
in Jensen, and, in spite of his protestations, Herrnstein, but it is a 
stretch to see it in Wilson.  In a reply to Wilson’s plaintive request 
that his colleague confirm or deny that he had been going around 
saying that “my book is not science,” Lewontin recapitulated his 
insulting letter to Herrnstein in 1973 and denied that Wilson’s book 
was a contribution to the Modern Synthesis by citing Dobzhansky 
against him (Wilson to Lewontin, October 27, 1976):   
We [SSG] said it wasn’t a work of science … It couldn’t 
have a real impact on science as opposed to public 
consciousness because to do so a book must have the 
effect of reorienting the thinking of working scientists, 
like Doby’s [1937, 1941] book did, which almost single 
handedly created a school of experimental and natural 
historical studies and gave strong impetus to a number 
of theoretical developments as the result of its re-
orientation of [views] about race formation and genetic 
variation in populations.  Your book can’t do this 
because it does not propose any testable hypotheses.  
The book has a lot of science in it but it is not [a book] of 
science.  It not only is not a science, but a religion.  [It is] 
a piece of scientific public relations (Lewontin to Wilson, 
October 28, 1976).  
Sensing an argument from authority, Wilson weakly replied by 
citing biologists who thought Sociobiology was not only science, 
but good science (Wilson to Lewontin, January 5, 1976).   Once 
Wilson regained his footing he took care to construct a pleasant, 
avuncular persona with which to address the public.  This voice, so 
unlike Lewonin’s, can be heard in the popular science he continues 
to write to this day. 
Lewontin’s attack on Wilson became legendary when at a 
meeting of the American Academy for the Advancement of Science 
partisans of Science for the People ran on stage and poured a 
bucket of water over the speaker’s head, shouting “Wilson, you’re 
all wet!” (Segerstrale 2000, 23).  The argument from ethos had 
turned into an argumentum ad baculam.  Such antics made it 
difficult to see the thrust of Lewontin’s reasoning.  Indeed, it is 
difficult to see his objections to sociobiology, let alone appreciate 
them, unless one has become familiar with the lines of argument 
(topoi) Lewontin had long been honing against Dobzhansky, 
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Jensen, and Herrnstein.  Not even the most well informed student 
of these “colleagues in conflict,” Ullica Segerstrale, does that 
systematically (Segerstrale, 2000).  This is why I have reviewed the 
sequence of controversies in which these reinforcing and 
cumulating lines of argument emerged. 
What lies at the heart of Lewontin’s attack on Wilson is his 
extension of his objections to fracturing the bonds between 
organism and environment, gene and organism, and culture and 
nature to atomizing the organism itself into a collection of 
separately evolved adaptations, or what, writing with Gould, 
Lewontin called adaptationism (Gould and Lewontin, 1979).  
Wilson’s commitment to adaptationism became even more ardent 
in essays in which he defended sociobiology than in Sociobiology 
itself.  In On Human Nature we are told that our species-defining 
set of behavioral traits evolved in the long Neolithic period in which 
natural selection worked freely and gradually.  Since then “the 
genes have [had] us on a leash, even if it is a long one” (Wilson 
1994, 338-339).  It is a good thing, too, that we are weakly 
determined by our genes to cooperate with our kin, because left to 
its own devices culture is destructive.  It can cause runaway 
disasters like Aztec sacrifice (Wilson 1994, 167, 207).   
In his critique, Lewontin charged Wilson with making worse the 
faulty notions that genes solve problems posed by environments 
and that the properties of those environments are somehow 
imprinted into a particular sequence of DNA that codes for this or 
that behavioral trait.  Behind his technical objections to these now 
widespread conceptions, however, lies a more fundamental one.  
The ideas to which Lewontin was objecting change the relation 
between culture and biology that Dobzhansky had articulated by 
working closely with anthropologists like Ashley Montagu and 
Sherwood Washburn (Smokovitis, 2012; Jackson and Depew, 
2017).  Wilson, Trivers, and other sociobiologists reject the idea 
that our genes flexibly (and equally) adapt us to our cultural niche.  
Instead, they insist that they keep tugging us back to the Stone Age.  
“Having dissolved society [into atomized individuals],” Lewontin 
and Fracchia write, “Sociobiology’s next step is… to neutralize 
culture” by dissolving the organism into atomistic adaptations and 
the genes they code for (Fracchia and Lewontin 1999, 71, 
reordered).   
This issue is of great moment.  For Lewontin, shifting this 
boundary means that the Modern Synthesis would no longer be 
able to protect biology from the racism and eugenics that by 1960 it 
had pushed to the margins of both public and scientific discourse 
(Jackson and Depe, 2017).  The inference has nothing to do with 
David Depew 26  Poroi 13,2 (January 2018) 
 
whether Wilson is a racist.  He is not.  But the atomistic ontology 
and genetic determinism with which Lewontin saw Dobzhansky 
flirting could easily metastasize into things Wilson took himself to 
oppose: social Darwinism, eugenics, and racism (Lewontin et al. 
1984).  To these sins we can add sexism.  Trivers’ notion of parental 
investment naturalized the gender roles feminists were beginning 
to challenge in the 1970s.  Wilson predicted that male domination 
would persist indefinitely. 
To make this point, Lewontin went beyond Dobzhansky’s 
repeated insistence that proving a trait to be an adaptation is 
difficult to asserting that the very idea of adaptation is 
contaminated by the creationist ideology Darwin tried to refute but 
actually restated by describing natural selection as taking God’s 
place as a designer (Lewontin 1978; 1993; Levins and Lewontin, 
1985).  An empirically grounded, experimentally based science of 
evolution that makes use of natural selection, Lewontin 
maintained, can thrive only by ridding itself of adaptationist 
thinking, even of Dobzhansky’s sort.  
 This and related arguments will be inaccessible to anyone who, 
like Wilson or Trivers, thinks of ideology merely as a set of beliefs 
that someone might have about social policy or party politics.  For 
Marxists of every stripe the function of ideology is to justify 
contingent, conventional, and local social practices by making them 
appear necessary, natural, and universal.  Ideology confers 
legitimacy on those who exercise power through discursive 
practices--Marx’s “superstructure”--that attempt to write 
systematic injustices and inequalities into the nature of things.  
These discursive practices are contained more basically in the 
conceptual frameworks in which we express our beliefs than in our 
beliefs themselves.  In entrenched capitalist societies, these 
categories are heavily weighted toward individualistic, atomistic, 
dualistic conceptions of the person and economistic conceptions of 
our motives such as those we see projected onto genes in parental 
investment theory.   The very fact that we think of an ideology as a 
particular person’s belief or, worse, “belief system” testifies to the 
individualistic categories in which we think about ourselves and 
others.   
This astigmatism dooms us to neglect social structures.  If we 
say, “The tubercle bacillus is the cause of tuberculosis,” Lewontin 
and Levins argue, we are singling out from a host of interacting 
factors a pathogen as “the cause,” and hence the explanation, of 
tuberculosis, thereby averting our eyes from changeable social 
factors that in promoting inequality increase the likelihood of this 
and other diseases, including genetic diseases (Levins and 
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Lewontin 1985, 270; Lewontin 1993, 45).  Likewise when the BGA 
suggests that a gene might be the cause of a propensity for crime 
(Levins and Lewontin 1985, 270).  By making everything we do 
result either from individual self-interested choices or inborn 
defects in our chromosomes we simultaneously blind those affected 
by policies and those who make them to the fact that these 
arrangements are neither necessary nor natural. 
Sticking Up for Lewontin 
It might be argued that Lewontin’s high-handed mode of address 
leads him to ignore the rhetor’s first rule:  Cultivate the good will of 
the audience (captatio benevolentiae).  It is also potentially self-
defeating.  If he is right about ideology American audiences will 
have been too deeply formed by the ideological forces he reports to 
understand or accept his insights.  After all, most Americans have 
never separated Marxism from Communist tyranny.  They are likely 
to turn off a scold who, unlike Gould, does not at least profess to 
share their perspectives and values.  
This objection leads to another.  How can Lewontin, who claims 
to be so scrupulous about what is and isn’t good science, be so 
cocksure about social theory, which falls outside his sphere of 
expertise?  How, too, can an enemy of biological determinism take 
such an uncommonly deterministic, old-fashioned Marxist view of 
the etiology and functions of socially disseminated ideas?  Ever 
since Gramsci there have been versions of Marxism that complicate 
the causal relation between economic base and ideological 
structure.  They include the New Left Marxism that flourished in 
Lewontin’s time and place.  Why shouldn’t his worry about how 
power distorts scientific inquiry--a thesis thoroughly established by 
sociologists, historians, and feminist philosophers of science--be 
just as telling if it is framed in terms of “humanistic” Marxism, 
which loosens the stranglehold the economic base is supposed to 
exert on the ideological superstructure, or even in the idiom of non-
Marxian critics of ideology like Bruno Latour, who is as holistic 
about causes as Lewontin (Latour 1988)? 
Our inquiry suggests an answer.  Whether rightly or not, 
Lewontin and Levins do not read Marx and Engels’ theory as 
deterministic, reductionistic, or even as functionalist, but as 
interactively holistic in ways that integrate biology and culture in an 
expanded naturalism.  In their view, reflexive, self-critical 
dialectical argumentation, so long as it is materialistic, enables 
biologists, ecologists, and social theorists to see culture, nature, 
organism, environment, and gene as a complex, dynamical, 
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processive whole.  By contrast, science’s computational-logistic 
method and the pragmatic-problem solving idiom that Dobzhansky 
picked up at John Dewey’s Columbia break this unity into a raft of 
dualisms that can never be put together again.12 Seen from this 
angle, Trivers’ and Wilson’s accusation that Lewontin’s ideology 
leads his science around by the nose is misplaced.  His appeal to 
dialectical materialism as an ancilla scientiae reflects his search for 
a philosophy that can do justice to the biological complexity that he 
has had a hand in revealing and that is now a major theme in 
evolutionary inquiry.  
 I find in these reflections a way of understanding what 
motivates Lewontin’s stress on his own authority.  It is true but 
irrelevant that he has probably always presented himself as the 
smartest kid on the block.  What is important is his tacit fear that if 
he were to address his audiences in the genial tones of a 
Dobzhansky or a Gould or a Wilson he would risk falling into the 
dualism, atomism, determinism, and mechanism on which he 
pounces.  He would be unable to vouch for his own scientific claims 
or recognize any complicity in the dominant ideology they might 
have.  He wants to communicate this reflexivity about the tacit 
premises and implications in his audience and encourage them to 
cultivate it.  His censoriousness is principally directed at his fellow 
scientists.  If they assume that science is as pure as the driven snow 
they are more likely to fail to hold themselves to high standards of 
evidence and to lend their authority to the dominant ideology.  
They will betray science’s claim to knowledge.  He is less critical of 
the general public.  As a Marxist he presumes they are already on 
the right side.  They need merely to be liberated from the discursive 
conditions that disempower them.  Lewontin may be wrong about 
whether his know-it-all persona and his “dialectical biology” 
achieve, or even serve, these goals.  Even so, in the land of the blind 
the one-eyed man is king. 
Copyright © 2018 David J. Depew 
 
                                                 
12 On Dobzhansky’s professed pragmatism, see Jackson and 
Depew, 2017, 54n5, 114. 
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